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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
THE SALT LAKE INVESTMENT COMPANY, 
a Utah corporation, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
WILFORD H. HANSEN STONE 
QUARRIES, INC., a Utah 
corporation, SHARRON KILLION 
JAMES T. JENSEN, JERRY J. JENSEN, 
DIX JENSEN, and all other persons 
unknown, claiming any right, 
title, estate or interest in, or 
lien upon the real property 
described in the pleading adverse 
to the plaintiff's ownership, or 
clouding its title thereto, 
Defendants and Appellees. 
Plaintiff and appellant, The Salt Lake Investment 
Company, a Utah Corporation, (hereinafter "plaintiff") respectfully 
petitions this Honorable Court for Writ of Certiorari to review the 
decision of the Court of Appeals in this matter. 
QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Does a dissolved corporation retain its corporate 
existence and powers for the purpose of protecting and disposing of 
its assets, including standing to sue to quiet title to real 
property owned by it? Is it for the same reasons subject to being 
sued regarding title to said assets? 
2. If a dissolved corporation has such a right and still 
holds title to mining claims is it conclusively barred from 
protecting those claims (by suit or otherwise) by lapse of some 
PETITION FOR WRIT 
OF CERTIORARI 
Case No. 
period of time or because its Articles of Dissolution mistakenly 
stated that it had disposed of its assets when in fact it still 
held title to 3 mining claims? 
REFERENCE TO COURT OF APPEALS OPINION: 
302 Utah Adv Rep 56, 927 P2d 200. 
CONCISE STATEMENT OF GROUNDS ON WHICH JURISDICTION 
OF THE SUPREME COURT OF UTAH IS INVOKED 
A. The opinion of the Court of Appeals for which 
defendant seeks review was filed October 31, 1996. 
B. Petition for Rehearing was filed November 14, 1996. 
C. Order denying Petition for Rehearing was entered 
January 10, 1997. 
D. Statutory provision conferring jurisdiction on the 
Supreme Court to review the decision of the Court of Appeals by 
Writ of Certiorari: Section 78-2-2(3) (a) and (5) Utah Code 
Annotated and 78-2a-4, Utah Code Annotated, and Title VII, Utah 
Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
CONTROLLING PROVISIONS OF CONSTITUTIONS, STATUTES. ORDINANCES 
AND REGULATIONS 
A. Amendment XIV, Section 1, United States Constitution 
B. Constitution of Utah, Art. I, Sections 7, 11, and 22. 
C. Section 16-10-101 UCA. (Repealed 1992) 
D. Sections 16-10a-1405 and 1701 UCA 
(Pertinent text of said citations is set forth in the Appendix) 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
NATURE OF THE CASE, This is an action by plaintiff 
seeking to quiet title to three tracts of real property situated in 
Utah County. (R. 5) 
COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS. After defendants were served with 
summons and complaint, defendant, Wilford H. Hansen Stone Quarries, 
Inc., a Utah corporation (hereafter "Corporate Defendant"), and 
defendant, Sharron Killion (hereinafter "Killion"), filed a 
Corrected Answer, Counterclaim and Cross-claim. (R. 89) Plaintiff 
filed a Amended Reply to said Counterclaim (R. 114), and 
defendants, James T. Jensen, Jerry J. Jensen and Dix Jensen 
(hereinafter "Jensens") filed an answer to said cross-claim. (R. 
107) The Jensens did not answer plaintiff's complaint, but filed 
a Motion to Dismiss under Rule 12(b), URCP, or in the Alternative 
for Summary Judgment. (R. 9) 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT. The lower court treated 
the motion as one for summary judgment and granted the same with 
prejudice. (R. 162, 184) Timely Motion to Alter and Amend 
Judgment was served and filed by plaintiff, but was denied. (R. 
232) The Counterclaim of the Corporate Defendant and Killion was 
dismissed with prejudice. (R. 254) The cross-claim of said 
defendants against the Jensens was dismissed without prejudice. (R 
254). Notice of Appeal was filed on July 7, 1995 (R.238), and an 
Amended Notice of Appeal was filed October 4, 1995 (R. 256), after 
the lower court entered its "Supplemental Order Confirming 
Dismissal of All Claims" on September 29, 1995. (R. 254) Court of 
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Appeals affirmed the decision of the district court in an opinion 
written by Judge Norman H. Jackson and concurred in by Judge Judith 
M. Billings. Judge Pamela T. Greenwood concurred in the result 
only. Petition for Rehearing was denied by the Court of Appeals. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
A. Plaintiff filed a complaint in the lower court to 
quiet title to three tracts of real property (mining claims) 
situated in Utah County. The Jensens are involved with only one of 
the tracts, and the other defendants are involved in all three of 
them. (R. 5) 
B. The Jensens filed a Motion to Dismiss under Rule 
12(b), URCP, or in the Alternative for Summary Judgment, alleging 
that plaintiff corporation had been dissolved and therefore had no 
standing to sue to quiet title to said properties. (R. 8) 
C. The Corporate Defendant and Killion answered 
plaintiff/s complaint on the merits and filed a Counterclaim 
against plaintiff and a cross-Claim against the Jensens (R. 89) . 
Plaintiff filed a Reply to said Counterclaim (R. 110) and the 
Jensens filed an answer to the cross-claim. (R.107) 
D. Defendants filed no affidavits, but several were 
filed on behalf of plaintiff. The Jensens and plaintiff filed 
certified copies of documents tending to show that some of the 
statutory steps for dissolution of plaintiff corporation had been 
undertaken. (R. 36 and 40) The Jensens filed a Certificate of the 
Utah Division of Corporations stating that plaintiff corporation 
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had been dissolved, (R. 41) Plaintiff however filed a Certificate 
of Search of the Utah Division of Corporations certifying that 
Certificate of Dissolution could not be found. (R. 154) 
E. The Jensens never filed an answer to plaintiff's 
complaint and no discovery was undertaken, completed, or allowed. 
F. The lower court granted the Motion for Summary 
Judgment of the Jensens and dismissed the plaintiff's complaint in 
its entirety and with prejudice as to the Jensens and also as to 
all other defendants in this action. (R. 162, 184) The lower 
court's order is based upon the following reasoning: " . . . Salt 
Lake Investment Company was a corporation that was dissolved in 
1965, and that said corporation therefore lacks standing to sue or 
be sued in Utah courts." 
G. The lower court's Order granting summary judgment 
did not deal with the merits of the quiet title action. (R. 162, 
184) 
H. Although requested (R. 46) , oral argument on the 
motion for summary judgment was denied on the grounds that 
plaintiff's opposition was "frivolous". (R. 162, 159) Although 
requested, oral argument on the plaintiff's motion to alter and 
amend was also not allowed. (R. 232) 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. THE DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS IS IN 
CONFLICT WITH DECISIONS OF THE SUPREME COURT. 
The Court of Appeals has ruled that plaintiff has no 
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standing to sue to protect its assets. This conclusion appears to 
be clearly contrary to the holdings of the Supreme Court in at 
least two decisions interpreting the applicable Utah statute. 
The statutory provision in effect between 1961 and 1992 
was found at Section 16-10-101, UCA, and provided as follows: 
"Notwithstanding the dissolution of a corporation either 
(1) by the issuance of a certificate of dissolution by 
the Division of Corporations and Commercial Code, or (2) 
by a decree of court, or (3) by expiration of its period 
of duration, the corporate existence of such corporation 
shall nevertheless continue for the purpose of winding up 
its affairs in respect to any property and assets which 
have not been distributed or otherwise disposed of prior 
to such dissolution, and to effect such purpose such 
corporation may sell or otherwise dispose of such 
property and assets, sue and be sued, contract, and 
exercise all other incidental and necessary powers." 
(Emphasis added.) 
(It should be noted that prior to 1984 the Secretary of State 
was referred to rather than the Division of Corporations and 
Commercial Code. Prior to 1961 the substance of said Section was 
found in Section 16-1-2, UCA, and in substantially that form has 
been a part of our law in Utah since at least 1898.) 
In Falconaero Enterprise, Inc. v. Valley Investment 
Company, 16 Utah 2d 77, 395 P2d 915 (1964), the Supreme Court 
upholds the clear meaning of said Section 101 where the court 
states at page 915: 
"Next, it is asserted that because of a dissolution of 
the plaintiff corporation, it had no standing in court, 
which seems to be answered by Title 16-10-100, 16-10-101, 
Utah Code Annotated 1953." 
Although the case of McKay & Knobel Enter. , Inc. v. Teton 
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Van Gas, Inc. , 23 Utah 2d 200, 460 P2d 828 (1969), dealt with a 
corporate suspension, it found that the law relating to dissolution 
was "instructive" and the court speaking through Justice Crockett 
referred to said Section 16-10-101 and said Section 16-1-;? and 
stated in connection therewith: 
"We accept the fact that there are good and sufficient 
reasons for this declared policy of the law that a 
corporation, even though dissolved, is able to sue and 
protect its assets. This enables it to better discharge 
the duties the law imposes upon it: to pay its taxes; 
to pay its creditors; to meet its obligations to 
stockholders who have invested in it. If in the process 
of *winding up its affairs' the supposedly xinsolvent' 
corporation should manage to salvage sufficient assets to 
revive and continue its life, it is only reasonable to 
suppose that it would have as much right to sue and 
conserve them as if it had proved to be completely 
defunct." (Emphasis added.) 
The court then *unt on to say that: 
"The considerations set forth above as to why a dissolved 
corporation, whose life has thus presumably been 
terminated, should be able to protect its assets, would 
seem to apply for even stronger reasons to a corporation 
which has merely been * suspended.'" 
Although these decisions were cited to the Court of 
Appeals there were entirely ignored, and the opinion of the Court 
of Appeals makes no reference to them. 
The crystal clear meaning of the foregoing statute as 
interpreted by the foregoing Utah cases is that a dissolved 
corporation retains its corporate existence for the purpose of 
protecting its assets. The law as thus enacted by the legislature 
and interpreted by this court, is made even more clea in the 
current version of the said statute enacted in 1992 which is found 
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at Section 16-10a-1405, UCA, and which states as follows: 
11
 (1) A dissolved corporation continues its corporate 
existence but may not carry on any business except that appropriate 
to wind U P and liquidate its business and affairs, including: 
(a) collecting its assets; 
(b) disposing of its properties that will not be 
distributed in kind to its shareholders; 
(c) discharging or making provision for discharging its 
liabilities; 
(d) distributing its remaining property among its 
shareholders according to their interest; and 
(e) doing every other act necessary to wind up and 
liquidate its business and affairs. 
" (2) Dissolution of a corporation does not: 
(a) transfer title to the corporation's property; 
(b) prevent transfer of its shares or securities, 
although the authorization to dissolve may provide for closing the 
corporation's share transfer records; 
(c) subject its directors or officers to standards of 
conduct different from those prescribed in Part 8; 
(d) change: 
(i) quorum or voting requirements of its board of 
directors or shareholders; 
(ii) provisions for selection, resignation, or 
removal of its directors or officers or both; or 
(iii) provisions for amending its bylaws or its 
articles of incorporation; 
(e) prevent commencement of a proceeding by or against 
the corporation in its corporate name; 
(f) abate or suspend a proceeding pending by or against 
the corporation on the effective date of dissolution; or 
(g) terminate the authority of the registered agent of 
the corporation." (Emphasis added.) 
Pursuant to Section 16-10a-1701 UCA, the aforesaid 
Section 16-10a-1405 UCA applies to all corporations in "existence" 
at the time of the passage of thereof (1992) , therefore since 
plaintiff is in existence for the purpose of protecting its assets 
then Section 16-10a-1405 UCA applies to plaintiff in this 
action. 
The decisions of this court are in accord with decisions 
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of other courts. For example, in Screwmen's Benev. Assn. of 
Louisiana v. Monteleone. 168 Louisiana 664, 122 Southern 116 
(1929), the Supreme Court of Louisiana held at pages 117 and 118: 
"When once a legal and valid existent corporation becomes 
the owner of property, such property remains the property 
of the corporation until disposed of in a manner provided 
by the charter or by the law. 
"Neither the stockholders of a stock corporation nor the 
members of a non-stock corporation ever become the owners 
in common of the property of such corporations. . 
"The same is true with respect to a corporation whose 
charter has expired, has been forfeited, or for any other 
cause has been dissolved. 
"Therefore, the property here involved continued to be 
the property of the corporation, separate and distinct 
from the members, and will remain so until disposed of or 
transferee in some manner provided by law." 
In the lower court, plaintiff disputed that it had been 
dissolved, but argued that even if it was dissolved, it still had 
the right to protect its assets. This case does not involve a 
situation where after dissolution plaintiff acquired mining claims 
which because of dissolution it had no business acquiring. In this 
case the subject mining claims have been the property of plaintiff 
since before dissolution, but they were overlooked, and they have 
never been conveyed out of the plaintiff corporation. The result 
of the decision of the Court of Appeals is that plaintiff cannot 
protect those assets in court. The reason:! ng of the Court of 
Appeals in reaching this decision appears to have been that the 
dissolution papers of the plaintiff indicate that plaintiff has 
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disposed of its assets, and therefore the plaintiff corporation has 
wound up its affairs, and since Section 16-10-101 is limited to 
"winding up" and since winding up is completed (simply because the 
articles of dissolution erroneously say it was), plaintiff cannot 
avail itself of the benefit of the statute. The Court of Appeals 
therefor holds that because of an error in the dissolution papers, 
plaintiff's assets are in effect forfeited, at least it appears 
inevitable that that which cannot be protected is in effect lost. 
Section 16-10-101 of course contemplates that winding up is a 
process that occurs after the dissolution papers are filed. That 
statute says: that the corporate existence continues for the 
purpose of winding up its affairs "in respect to any property and 
assets which have not been distributed or otherwise disposed of 
prior to such dissolution." The filing of the articles of 
dissolution is not the end; it is nothing more than the beginning 
of the winding up phase, and plaintiff should not be barred by an 
innocent mistake made prior to winding up. It must be evident that 
winding up is not a time-driven concept. It is only intended to be 
descriptive of the situation that exists where the dissolved 
corporation still has original assets that it has not disposed of, 
and if it still has such, it is by definition still winding up. 
On the one hand, the opinion of the Court of Appeals 
seems to hold that plaintiff has no winding up period after 
dissolution because of the erroneous statement in the articles of 
dissolution that it had disposed of its assets. On the other hand 
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the lower court held that "30 years i s far beyond a reasonable time 
to wind-up" and the Court of Appeals states that "We therefore 
conclude the trial court correctly ruled that because SLI's 
winding-up period was over it row Id no longer sue or be sued ," so 
a time element appears to have been introduced into winding up 
which is unnecessary and will create untold and unnecessary 
mischief. 1 t does i lot matter if the1 f1 nine i,v Long ur short. The 
fact that there is a time element destroys any certainty in the law 
relating to dissolved corporations. No one will know with any 
assurance whether the winding \ lp peri od i n a given case is "over." 
A law suit will be necessary to determine that in every case. No 
one can know with any assurance who is in control and who they can 
safely deal with. 
There is no reason for a time limitation on winding up. 
If the officers of the company take too long in winding up, it is 
presumably the shareholders who are injured, But how are the 
shareholders helped if the corporation is stripped of its assets 
because it does not wind up fast enough? How are the shareholders 
helped if they are precluded from suing the corporation, as they 
are under the decision of the Court of Appeals. If the court wants 
to speed up the process of winding up, it should not do so at the 
expense of the very shareholders who are presumably supposed to be 
the beneficiaries of that speed. If "stripping" is what the court 
has in mi nd, :i t on] y helps speculators and. prof iteers. Sure] y this 
court cannot countenance such a result. 
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If plaintiff cannot protect its assets in court, then one 
of the following must follow: (1) the assets of the dissolved 
corporation are in effect forfeited because of the inability of the 
corporation to protect them, (2) the corporation can still convey 
its assets even though it cannot sue to protect them, or (3) the 
assets pass to the shareholders by operation of law making a 
lawsuit unnecessary. 
As to (1) "forfeiture," such a result is totally 
unacceptable and should not be permitted by this court. It clearly 
violates federal due process and equal protection, Amendment XIV, 
Section 1, United States Constitution, and State due process as 
well as the related State open courts provision and provision 
against taking without just compensation, Constitution of Utah, 
Article I, Sections 7, 11 and 22. 
As to (2) "conveyance by the corporation," it is true 
that both Section 16-10-101 and Section 16-10a-1405 allow the 
dissolved corporation to dispose of its assets during winding up, 
so presumably it can deed its property to its shareholders or to 
third parties, but the same statutes also allow it to sue during 
winding up, so if under the opinion of the Court of Appeals, 
plaintiff cannot sue because winding up is complete, why can it 
convey its title because the same winding up is complete? If the 
acts described in said sections can only be done during the winding 
up period, and if the winding up period is over (whether at the 
time of the filing of the dissolution papers or later) , then 
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plaintiff is presumably unable to convey title to the subject 
claims to its shareholders just as it is unable to sue and be sued. 
Certainly the other claimants to the subject claims will cite the 
opinion of the Court i Appeals in this case t.o that effect, ami at 
the least further appeals will be necessary to clarify that issue. 
As to (3) "assets passing by operation of law to the 
sharehoIders," both Secti on 16-10-101 and 2 6-1 0a-1 405 establish 
that the assets do not so pass. A holding by this court that they 
do so pass, although better than forfeiture, would create numerous 
problems and the more shareholders in the dissolved corporation the 
bigger the problems. We are aware of a dissolved mining company 
with 700 shareholders holding in excess of 350 acres of valuable 
mining claims. It seems inconceivable that a court would hold that 
the title r > those claims passes by operation of law to the 
shareholders so as to create a situati on where 700 shareholders 
hold as tenants in common. It would be a nightmare creating among 
others the following problems: 
1. At what poi nt does title pass? At dissolution? A 
specified number of years later? A "reasonable" time later? What 
criteria determine a "reasonable" time? When can a third party 
safely deal with the corporate on a nd wl: in an must it deal with the 
shareholders? 
2. Does the transfer of stock in a dissolved corporation 
carry with it the real estate, or after dissoli ltioi I does the real 
estate vest in the stockholder, so that transfer of his stock does 
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not carry with it his interest in the real estate? 
3. If the transfer of the shares does carry with it the 
shareholders vested undivided interest in the real estate, then 
what problems have we created by allowing real estate to be 
transferred without a deed? Voluntary transfer without a deed has 
not heretofore been allowed, so how can it be wise or prudent to 
allow it now? 
The holdings of this court in Falcanaero and McKay & 
Knobel were correct, and the Supreme Court should grant certiorari 
to correct the opinion of the Court of Appeals to conform 
therewith. 
POINT II. THE DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS DEPRIVES 
PLAINTIFF OF DUE PROCESS AND EQUAL PROTECTION AND RELATED 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTIONS, LEAVES PLAINTIFF AS OWNER OF REAL 
PROPERTY WITHOUT ANY RIGHT TO PROTECT ITS ASSETS, AND THE COURT OF 
APPEALS HAS THEREBY SO FAR DEPARTED FROM ACCEPTED AND USUAL COURSE 
OF JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS AS TO REQUIRE THE SUPERVISION OF THE 
SUPREME COURT. 
Not only has the opinion of the Court of Appeals left 
plaintiff with no remedy, but the said opinion contradicts itself 
with respect to plaintiff's claim to title, and leaves those who 
deal with such claims very much in the dark. The Court of Appeals 
on page three of its opinion states that: 
"SLI [plaintiff] has not disputed the accuracy of its articles of 
dissolution which read in pertinent part: 
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"FOURTH: All remaining property and assets of the 
corporation have been distributed among its 
shareholders, in accordance with their respective 
rights and interests." 
We take this to mean that since the articles of 
dissolution state that plaintiff has disposed of its assets and 
since plaintiff (according to said opinion) does not dispute that 
statement in the articles of dissolution that therefore plaintiff 
has no title. That conclusion is totally incomprehensible. This 
whole lawsuit disputes the accuracy of that statement and of the 
articles themselves. Plaintiff has title to t.he property. 
Plaintiff so claims in its complaint, and on summary judgment that 
must be conceded to plaintiff. Furthermore, that is clear because 
all of the defendants ha v e tried t o obtain that title 1 rom 
plaintiff. 
In contradiction to the foregoing, at note 4 of the Court 
of Appeals opinion, the Court of Appeals states: 
"SLI [plaintiff] worries about the disposition of 
property in this and similar cases in which a dissolved 
corporation may remain in the uncertain chain of title, 
yet has no standing to resolve that issue. However 
compelling that question may be, it is not before us at 
this time. Our narrow holding is that, in this case, SLI 
has no standing to sue to quiet title to the mining 
claims involved. Other corporations and individuals 
concerned about the title to the claims here must simply 
pursue their own remedies, supported by whatever other 
legal theories may apply." 
That statement appears to concede that plaintiff is in 
the chain of title, which we take to mean that plaintiff has title, 
-15-
but the Court of Appeals expressly holds that plaintiff cannot 
protect its title in court. The Court of Appeals thus appears to 
say first that plaintiff has not title, but later acknowledges that 
it does but that it cannot do anything about it. Such a result 
clearly calls for the intervention of this court, because the Court 
of Appeals is correct in stating that this is a "compelling 
question." How the Court of Appeals can claim that said issue is 
not before it is incomprehensible. The question was squarely 
before the Court of Appeals. It is now squarely before this court. 
Section 16-10-101 and Section 16-10a-1405 make it abundantly clear 
that plaintiff retains its title to the subject mining claims and 
that they have not passed by operation of law to the shareholders. 
Although the Court of Appeals suggests that the individual 
shareholders of plaintiff can somehow pursue a "remedy" by whatever 
"legal theories may apply," under the court's opinion this cannot 
involve court action by or against the title holder, because 
according to the decision of the Court of Appeals, plaintiff cannot 
sue or be sued, and as we have noted, although it is true that both 
Section 16-10-101 and Section 16-10a-1405 allow the dissolved 
corporation to dispose of its assets, so presumably it can deed its 
property to its shareholders or to third parties (and this may be 
what the Court of Appeals has in mind) , but the same statutes also 
allow it to sue and be sued, so if under the opinion of the Court 
of Appeals plaintiff cannot sue why can it convey its title? If 
the acts described in said sections can only be done during the 
-16-
winding up period, and if the winding up period is over, then 
plaintiff is presumably unable to convey title to the subject 
claims to its shareholders just as it is unable to sue and be sued. 
The opinion of the cour t clouds any action which the corporation 
may take. If there is some policy reason why the corporation 
cannot sue but can convey its property (in other words winding up 
is over for purposes of lawsuits but winding up is not over for 
purposes of a conveyance) then the opinion should be modified to so 
state. If the plaintiff now attempts to convey the title to the 
shareholders or third parties, then this action will almost 
certainly be met with the argument that the winding up is over and 
that: th is precludes a conveyance just as i t precludes a. 1 .awsuit. 
This important matter should not be left up in the air. The 
opinion of the Court of Appeals instead of solving anything, has 
simply clouded the title even further, ai id i s an open i nvitation to 
endless litigation in this and other cases. 
This decision of the Court of Appeals deprives plaintiff 
of due process and equal protection and is in violation of the open 
courts provision of the Utah Constitution and of the Utah 
constitutional provision against unlawful seizures, and leaves 
plaintiff without any right to protect its property, and the Court 
of Appeals in so holding has so far departed from the accepted and 
usual course of judicial proceedings as to require the supervision 
of the Supreme Court. (Amendment XIV, Section 1, United States 
Constitution; Constitution of Utah, Art. I, Sections 7, 11, and 
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22.) 
POINT III. IN ANY EVENT, THE COURT OF APPEALS HAS 
DECIDED AN IMPORTANT QUESTION OF STATE LAW WHICH SHOULD BE SETTLED 
BY THE SUPREME COURT. 
Even if the decision of the Court of Appeals were not in 
conflict with the opinions of this court in Falcanaero and McKay & 
Knobel, the determination of whether a dissolved corporation can 
protect its assets or whether it loses its right to do so after a 
certain period of time or otherwise, should be settled by the 
Supreme Court. Dissolved corporations hold the title to numerous 
properties in this state, particularly mining claims. Some of 
these claims still have significant importance for mining. Others 
are now very valuable because of the surface rights - this is 
particularly so in locations such as the Wasatch Mountains. This 
important matter deserves a far more thorough treatment than the 
Court of Appeals gave it, and should be settled by this court. 
Plaintiff respectfully submits that the Court of Appeals decision 
has created more problems that it has solved. It will be an 
unending source of confusion and will involve numerous parties and 
the courts in needless litigation for years to come. Decisions of 
appellate courts should, where possible, have the opposite result. 
They should enlighten and clarify. They should not confuse and 
obscure. These issues need to be resolved by this court. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons plaintiff respectfully requests 
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that the Supreme Court grant its Writ of Certiorari herein, 
DATED the day of February, 1997. 
Respectfully submitted, 
ROBERT C. CUMMINGS 
MICHAEL D. CUMMINGS 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
and Appellant 
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APPENDIX 
CONTROLLING PROVISIONS OF CONSTITUTIONS, STATUTES, 
ORDINANCES AND REGULATIONS from Page 2: 
A. Amendment XIV, Section 1, United States Constitution 
B. Constitution of Utah, Article I, Sections 7, 11, and 
22. 
C. Section 16-10-101 UCA. (Repealed 1992) 
D. Sections 16-10a-1405 and 1701 UCA 
COURT OF APPEALS OPINION AND OTHER ORDERS AND PLEADINGS 
Page of record 
1. Opinion of the Court of Appeals 
2. Order (denying petition for rehearing) 
3. Ruling (on motion for summary judgment) 162 
4. Order Granting Jensen Defendant's Motion 
for Summary Judgment 184 
5. Ruling (on motion to alter and amend) 232 
6. Supplemental Order 254 
7. Complaint 5 
8. Motion to Dismiss, or Alternately 
for Summary Judgment 9 
CONTROLLING PROVISIONS OF CONSTITUTIONS, STATUTES, ORDINANCES 
AND REGULATIONS: 
Amendment XIV, Section 1, United States Constitution: 
"All persons born or naturalized in the United States, 
and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of 
the United States and of the State wherein they reside. 
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall 
abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the 
United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of 
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; 
nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal 
protection of the laws." 
Constitution of Utah, Article I, Section 7: 
"No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or 
property, without due process of law." 
Constitution of Utah, Article I, Section 11: 
"All courts shall be open, and every person, for an 
injury done to him in his person, property or reputation, 
shall have remedy by due course of law, which shall be 
administered without denial or unnecessary delay; and no 
person shall be barred from prosecuting or defending 
before any tribunal in this State, by himself or counsel, 
any civil cause to which he is a party." 
Constitution of Utah, Article I, Section 22: 
"Private property shall not be taken or damaged for 
public use without just compensation." 
Section 16-10-101 UCA (Repealed 1992): 
Notwithstanding the dissolution of a corporation either 
(1) by the issuance of a certificate of dissolution by 
the Division of Corporations and Commercial Code, or (2) 
by a decree of court, or (3) by expiration of its period 
2 
of duration, the corporate existence of such corporation 
shall nevertheless continue for the purpose of winding up 
its affairs in respect to any property and assets which 
have not been distributed or otherwise disposed of prior 
to such dissolution, and to effect such purpose such 
corporation may sell or otherwise dispose of such 
property and assets, sue and be sued, contract, and 
exercise all other incidental and necessary powers. 
Section 16-10a-1405 UCA: 
(1) A dissolved corporation continues its corporate existence 
but may not carry on any business except that appropriate to wind 
up and liquidate its business and affairs, including: 
(a) collecting its assets; 
(b) disposing of its properties that will not be 
distributed in kind to its shareholders; 
(c) discharging or making provision for discharging its 
liabilities; 
(d) distributing its remaining property among its 
shareholders according to their interest; and 
(e) doing every other act necessary to wind up and 
liquidate its business and affairs. 
(2) Dissolution of a corporation does not: 
(a) transfer title to the corporations property; 
(b) prevent transfer of its shares or securities, 
although the authorization to dissolve may provide for closing the 
corporation's share transfer records; 
(c) subject its directors or officers to standards of 
conduct different from those prescribed in Part 8; 
(d) change: 
(i) quorum or voting requirements of its board of 
directors or shareholders; 
(ii) provisions for selection, resignation, or 
removal of its directors or officers or both; or 
(iii) provisions for amending its bylaws or its 
articles of incorporation; 
(e) prevent commencement of a proceeding by or against 
the corporation in its corporate name; 
(f) abate or suspend a proceeding pending by or against 
the corporation on the effective date of dissolution; or 
(g) terminate the authority of the registered agent of 
the corporation. 
Section 16-10a-1701 UCA: 
"Except as otherwise provided in Section 16-10a-1704, 
this chapter applies to all domestic corporations in 
existence on July 1, 1992, that were incorporated under 
any general statute of this state providing for 
incorporation of corporations for profit, and to actions 
3 
taken by the directors, officers, and shareholders of 
such corporations after July 1, 1992." 
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lant has failed to provide adequate legal anal-
ysis and legal authority in support of his 
claims, appellant's assertions do not permit 
appellate review. 
CONCLUSION 
Lawrence's appellate brief fails to conform 
to the requirements of Rule 24 of the Utah 
Rules of Appellate Procedure. We therefore 
decline to address Lawrence's claims on ap-
peal and affirm the trial court's rulings. 
WILKINS, J., concurs. 
ORME, P.J., concurs in result only. 
(o | KEY NUMBER SYSTEM > 
SALT LAKE INVESTMENT COMPANY, 
a Utah corporation, Plaintiff and 
Appellant, 
v. 
WILFORD H. HANSEN STONE QUAR-
RIES, INC., a Utah corporation; Shar-
ron Killion; James T. Jensen; Jerry J. 
Jensen; Dix Jensen; and all other per-
sons unknown claiming any right, title, 
estate or interest in or lien upon the real 
property described in the pleading ad-
verse to the plaintiffs ownership, or 
clouding its title thereto, Defendants 
and Appellees. 
No. 950705-CA. 
Court of Appeals of Utah. 
Oct. 31, 1996. 
Corporation brought action seeking to 
quiet title to three patented mining claims. 
The District Court, Fourth District, Provo 
Department, Lynn W. Davis, J., granted 
summary judgment for defendants, and cor-
poration appealed. The Court of Appeals, 
Jackson, J., held that corporation lacked 
standing to pursue action because it had been 
dissolved and had finished winding up its 
affairs. 
Affirmed. 
Greenwood, J., concurred in result only. 
Corporations <®=>630(1) 
Corporation lacked standing to bring 
quiet title action as to patented mining claims 
because, in view of articles of dissolution 
which indicated that corporation had been 
dissolved and had completed winding-up pro-
cess, corporation was no longer eligible to 
sue or be sued for purpose of winding up its 
affairs. U.C.A.1953, 16-10-101 (Repealed). 
Robert C. Cummings and Michael D. Cum-
mings, Salt Lake City, for Appellant. 
Derek Langton, Salt Lake City, for Appel-
lees Jensen. 
Wilford N. Hansen, Jr., Payson, for Corpo-
rate Appellee and Appellee Killion. 




Salt Lake Investment Company (SLI) 
challenges the trial court's summary judg-
ment for Wilford H. Hansen Stone Quarries, 
Inc., Sharron Killion, James T. Jensen, Jerry 
J. Jensen, and Dix Jensen (collectively, Jen-
sens). We affirm. 
FACTS 
During the summer of 1965, SLFs board of 
directors and shareholders agreed to dissolve 
SLI. The undisputed documents in the rec-
ord show SLI then proceeded according to 
the statutory scheme applicable in 1965. See 
Utah Code Ann. §§ 16-10-79 to—82, S7 to -
88 (1962) (repealed 1992). In October 1965, 
SLI filed with the secretary of state a state-
ment of intent to dissolve the corporation. 
Sec id. § 16-10-79 (repealed 1992). SLI re-
ceived a tax clearance from the state tax 
coiamission, which was filed with the secre-
tary of state in December 1965. See id. 
SALT LAKE INV. v. HANSEN STONE QUARRIES Utah 201 
Cite as 927 P.2d 200 (UlahApp. 1996) 
§ lfi-10-80 (repealed 1992). Finally, on De-
cember 30, 19G5, SLI filed with the secretary 
of state its articles of dissolution. See id. 
§§ 16-10-87, -88 (repealed 1992). 
Almost thirty years later, in October 1994, 
SLI brought suit against Jensens, seeking to 
quiet title to three patented mining claims,1 
Jensens moved for summary judgment on 
the basis that SLI had no standing to sue 
because it had dissolved and wound up its 
affairs. The trial court granted summary 
judgment for Jensens, determining "30 years 
is far beyond a reasonable time to wind-up 
the activities of a corporation," under section 
16-10-101 of the Utah Code, which allowed a 
dissolved corporation to "sue and be sued" 
only "for the purpose of winding up its af-
fairs in respect to any property and assets 
which have not been distributed or otherwise 
disposed of prior to . . . dissolution," id. 
§ 16-10-101 (repealed 1992). SLI attacks 
the trial court's ruling, arguing it has the 
right to sue under section 16-10-101 because 
the quiet title action is part of its winding up 
process.2 
ANALYSIS 
Summary judgment is proper only if no 
genuine issues of material fact exist and the 
movant is "entitled to a judgment as a matter 
of law." Utah R.Civ.P. 56(c). We view the 
facts from a perspective favoring the losing 
party and review the trial court's summary 
judgment ruling for correctness, according 
no deference to its conclusions. Mountain 
1. Actually, SLI's two former shareholders initi-
ated this suit in SLI's name. 
2. SLI also raises the issue of whether it is dis-
solved, but states in its brief "that dissolution is 
irrelevant on the issue of its right to sue and be 
sued." Because SLI's right to sue and be sued is 
really the sole issue in this case, and SLI has not 
explained how the question of its dissolution 
relates to that issue, we do not address the disso-
lution issue. Our analysis assumes SLI was dis-
solved on December 30, 1965, as certified by the 
Utah Division of Corporations and Commercial 
Code. 
SLI further challenges the trial court's denial 
of its requests for oral argument on the summary 
judgment motion and for permission to add Eve-
lyn P. Boyce and Lois P. Connell as individual 
plaintiffs. We have reviewed these issues and 
conclude they are meritless; thus, we decline to 
States Tel & Tel Co. v. Garfield County, 811 
P.2d 184, 192 (Utah 1991). 
SLI has not disputed the accuracy of its 
articles of dissolution which read in pertinent 
part: 
THIRD: All debts, obligations and lia-
bilities of the corporation have been paid 
and discharged, or adequate provision has 
been made therefor. 
FOURTH: All remaining property and 
assets of the corporation have been distrib-
uted among its shareholders, in accordance 
with their respective rights and interests. 
FIFTH: There are no suits pending 
against the corporation in any court in 
respect of which adequate provision has 
not been made for the satisfaction of any 
judgment, order or decree which may be 
entered against it. 
See Utah Code Ann. § 16-10-87 (1962) (re-
pealed 1992) (outlining content of articles of 
dissolution). The articles thus assert that 
SLI completed a textbook winding-up pro-
cess.3 See 8 Zolman Cavitch, Business Orga-
nizations § 189.02, at 189-9 (1992) (outlining 
wind-up activities); see also Model Business 
Corp. Act Ann. § 14.03 annot. hist. (Supp. 
1996) (noting under version of act existing in 
1965 corporations "filed articles of dissolution 
when the winding-up process was complet-
ed"). Consequently, under the former stat-
ute, having already wound up, SLI is no 
longer eligible to sue or be sued "for the 
purpose of winding up its affairs," Utah Code 
Ann. § 16-10-101 (1962) (repealed 1992).4 
address them. See State v. Carter, lib P.2d 886, 
888-89 (Utah 1989). 
3. Not until pressed at oral argument did SLI give 
an explanation for its current conduct, which 
appears to contradict its articles of dissolution. 
There, SLI finally offered the excuse that it had 
merely forgotten about the mining claims at issue 
here and had not actually distributed them as 
stated in its articles. 
4. SLI worries about the disposition of property 
in this and similar cases in which a dissolved 
corporation may remain in an uncertain chain of 
title, yet has no standing to resolve that issue. 
However compelling that question may be, it is 
not before us at this time. Our narrow holding 
is that, in this case, SLI has no standing to sue to 
quiet title to the mining claims involved. Other 
corporations and individuals concerned about 
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We therefore conclude the trial court cor-
rectly ruled that because SLl's winding-up 
period was over it could no longer sue or be 
sued. Accordingly, we affirm. 
BILLINGS, J., concurs. 
GREENWOOD, J., concurs in result only. 
(o | KEY NUMBER SYSTEM > 
In the Matter of the ADOPTION 
OF B.O., a minor. 
P.O., Appellant, 
v. 
S.G. and C.G., Appellees. 
No. 960010-CA. 
Court of Appeals of Utah. 
Oct. 31, 1996. 
In adoption case, the Third District 
Court, Salt Lake Department, Leslie A. Lew-
is, J., terminated father's parental rights for 
failing to conduct more than token efforts to 
support or communicate with child. Father 
appealed. The Court of Appeals, Davis, As-
sociate P.J., held that: (1) as matter of first 
impression, statute permitting termination of 
parental rights for failure to conduct more 
than token efforts to support or communicate 
with child is constitutional; (2) district court 
had concurrent jurisdiction with juvenile 
court; and (3) father's letters, gifts, and tele-
phone calls rarely exceeding two instances 
per year could be found to be only token 
efforts. 
Affirmed. 
1. Adoption 0»15 
Father failed to preserve claim that trial 
court applied improper legal standard in ter-
minating parental rights, where he supported 
application of that statutory standard at trial. 
U.C.A.1953, 78-3a-407; 78-3Q-5 (Repealed). 
2. Appeal and Error <£=>882(1) 
Appellant cannot both wholeheartedly 
support application of given statute at trial 
and then on appeal claim that court's applica-
tion of that same statute was error. 
3. Infants <3>196 
District court has concurrent jurisdiction 
with juvenile court over termination of pa-
rental rights for failure to conduct more than 
token efforts to support or communicate with 
child, abandonment, neglect or abuse, unfit-
ness or incompetence, care of child in out-of-
home placement, failure of parental adjust-
ment, voluntary relinquishment of rights, or 
failure to give proper parental care and pro-
tection. U.C.A.1953, 78-3a-407, 78-3a-
104(l)(e), 78-30-4.16(l)(b). 
4. Infants <3=>248.1 
Simple reiteration of facts supporting 
position does not satisfy obligation to mar-
shal all evidence supporting challenged find-
ings for termination of parental rights and 
then to show clear lack of support despite the 
evidence. 
5. Adoption <3=>7.4(1, 6) 
Father's contact with child primarily in 
form of letters, gifts, and telephone calls 
rarely exceeding two instances' per year 
could be found to be "token efforts" support-
ing termination of parental rights, despite 
trial court's use of abandonment analysis; 
correspondence for Christmas and birthday 
often arrived after event had passed, and 
father was substantially in arrears of modest 
child support obligation. U.C.A.19f>3, 7S-3a-
407(6)(a). 
Sec publication Words and Phrases 
for other judicial constructions and def-
initions. 
the title to the claims here must simply pursue legal theories may apply, 
their own remedies, supported by whatever other 
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publication in the Pacific Reporter. 
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Before Judges Billings, Greenwood, and Jackson. 
JACKSON, Judge: 
Salt Lake Investment Company (SLI) challenges the trial 
court's summary judgment for Wilford H. Hansen Stone Quarries, 
Inc., Sharron Killion, James T. Jensen, Jerry J. Jensen, and Dix 
Jensen (collectively, Jensens). We affirm. 
FACTS 
During the summer of 1965, SLIfs board of directors and 
shareholders agreed to dissolve SLI. The undi.: ?uted documents in 
the record show SLI then proceeded according tc the statutory 
scheme applicable in 1965. See Utah Code Ann. §^ 16-10-79 to -
82, -87 to -88 (1962) (repealed 1992). In Octc*:ar 1965, SLI 
filed with the secretary of state a statement or intent to 
dissolve the corporation. See id. § 16-10-79 (repealed 1992). 
SLI received a tax clearance from the state tax commission, which 
was filed with the secretary of state in December 1965. See iii^ . 
§ 16-10-80 (repealed 1992). Finally, on December 30, 1965, SLI 
filed with the secretary of state its articles of dissolution. 
S££L iil*. §§ 16-10-87, -88 (repealed 1992). 
Almost thirty years later, in October 1994, SLI brought suit 
against Jensens, seeking to quiet title to three patented mining 
claims.1 Jensens iroved for summary judgment on the basis that 
SLI had no standing to sue because it had dissolved and wound up 
its affairs. The crial court granted summary judgment for 
Jensens, determining "30 years is far beyond a reasonable time t6 
wind-up the activities of a corporation," under section 16-10-101 
of the Utah Code, which allowed a dissolved corporation to "sue 
and be sued" only "for the purpose of winding up its affairs in 
respect to any property and assets' which have not been 
distributed or otherwise disposed of prior to . . . dissolution," 
id. § 16-10-101 (repealed 1992). SLI attacks the trial court's 
ruling, arguing it has the right to sue under section 16-10-101 
because the quiet title action is part of its winding up 
process.2 
1. Actually, SLIfs two former shareholders initiated this suit 
in SLI's name. 
2. SLI also raises the issue of whether it is dissolved, but 
states in its brief "that dissolution is irrelevant on the issue 
of its right to sue and be sued." Because SLI's right to sue and 
be sued is really the sole issue in this case, and SLI has not 
explainednho*|^to^ relates^to^ that, 
issued we do not address the'dissolution issue. Our analysis 
assumes SLI was dissolved on December 30, 1965,,»,*as>,certified by 
the Utah Division'of Corporations and Commercial7Code. 
SLI further challenges the trial court's denial of its 
requests for oral argument on the summary judgment motion and for 
permission to add Evelyn P. Boyce and Lois P. Connell as 
individual plaintiffs. We have reviewed these issues and 
conclude they are meritless; thus, we decline to address them. 
See State v. Carter, 776 P.2d 886, 888-89 (Utah 1989). 
950705-CA 2 
ANALYSIS 
Summary judgment is proper only if no genuine issues of 
material fact exist and the movant is "entitled to a judgment as 
a matter of law." Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c). We view the facts from 
a perspective favoring the losing party and review the trial 
court's summary judgment ruling for correctnessf according no 
deference to its conclusions. Mountain States Tel. & Tel» CQ» VO, 
Garfield County, 811 P.2d 184, 192 (Utah 1991). 
SLI has not disputed the accuracy of its., articles of 
dissolution which^read impertinent part: 
THIRD: All debts, obligations and 
liabilities of the corporation have been paid 
and discharged, or adequate provision has 
been made therefor. 
FOURTH: All remaining property and 
assets of the corporation have been 
distributed among its shareholders, in 
accordance with their respective rights and 
interests. 
FIFTH: There are no suits pending 
against the corporation in any court in 
respect of which adequate provision has not 
been made for the satisfaction of any 
judgment, order or decree which may be 
entered against it. 
See Utah Code Ann. § 16-10-87 (1962) (repealed 1992) (outlining 
content of articles of dissolution). The articles thus assert 
that SLI completed a textbook winding-up process.3 See 8 Zolman 
Cavitch, Business Organizations § 189.02, at 189-9 (1992) 
(outlining wind-up activities); see also Model Business Corp. Act 
Ann. § 14.03 annot. hist. (Supp. 1996) (noting under version of 
act existing in 1965 corporations "filed articles of dissolution 
when the winding-up process was completed"). Consequently, under 
the former statute, having already wound up, SLI is no longer 
3. Not until pressed "at oral argument did SLI give an -
explanation for its current conduct, which appears to contradict 
its articles of dissolution. There, SLI finally offered the 
excuse that it had;merely forgotten about the^mining claims at 
issue here and had not actually distributed them'as stated in its 
articles. 
950705-CA 3 
eligible to^sue.or be sued ,ffor the purpose of winding up its 
affairs," Utah Code Ann. § 16-10-101 (1962) (repealed 1992).4 
*Je therefore conclude the trial court correctly ruled that 
because SLI's winding-up period was over it could no longer sue 
or be sued"! SCcur difig^ y-7—we-a^ g-f-irm-: • 
N4rman H. Jacksofff; Judge 
I CONCUR: 
fudith M. Billings, Judge1 
I CONCUR I1T RESULT ONLYt 
Pamela T. Greenwood, Judge 
4. SLI worries about the disposition of property in this and 
similar cases in which a dissolved corporation may remain in an 
uncertain chain of^title, yet has no standing to resolve that 
issue. However compellingrthatrquestion may^be^it is-not before 
us at>this***time. Our narrow holding is that, in this case, SLI 
has no standing to sue to quiet title to the mining claims 
involved. Other corporations and individuals concerned about the 
title to the claims here must simply pursue their own remedies, 
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Clerk of the Court 
Salt Lake Investment Company, 
a Utah corporation, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
v< 
Wilford H. Hansen Stone 
Quarries, Inc., a Utah 
corporation; Sharron Killion; 
James T. Jensen; Jerry J. 
Jensen; Dix Jensen; and all 
other persons unknown claiming 
any right, title, estate or 
interest in or lien upon the 
real property described in the 
pleading adverse to the 
plaintiff's ownership, or 
clouding its title thereto, 
Defendants and Appellees. 
ORDER 
Case No. 950705-CA 
This matter is before the court upon appellant's petition 
for rehearing, filed November 14, 1996. 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the petition for rehearing is 
denied. 
Dated this \C day of January, 1397. 
FOR THE COURT: 
F 
Pamela T. Greenwood, Judge 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on January 10, 1997, a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing ORDER was deposited in the United States 
mail to the parties listed below: 
Robert C. Cummings, Esq, 
Michael D. Cummings, Esq, 
225 S. 200 E., #150 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Derek Langton, Esq. 
P.O. Box 45898 
Salt Lake City, UT 84145-0898 
Wilford N. Hansen, Jr., Esq. 
P.O. Box 67 
Payson, UT 84651-0067 
and a true and correct copy of the foregoing ORDER was deposited in the 
United States mail to the trial court listed below: 
Fourth District Court 
P.O. Box 1847 
125 North 100 West 
Provo, UT 84603 




Case No. 950705-CA 
Fourth District, Provo Dept., #940400611 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
•*H± 
**t. 
THE SALT LAKE INVESTMENT 
COMPANY, a Utah corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
WILFORD H. HANSEN STONE 
QUARRIES, INC., a Utah Corporation, 
SHARRON KILLION, JAMES T. JENSEN, 
JERRY J. JENSEN, DIX JENSEN, and all 
other persons unknown, claiming any right, 
title, estate or interest in, or lien upon the 
real property described in the pleading 
adverse to the Plaintiffs-ownership, or 
clouding its title thereto, 
Defendants. 
RULING ON DEFENDANTS'} 
MOTION TO DISMISS, O R ( X A _ ^ 
ALTERNATIVELY, FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT 
CASE NO. 940400611 
DATE: March 27, 1995 
JUDGE: LYNN W. DAVIS 
This matter came before the Court on Defendants' (James, Jerry, and Dix Jensen) 
Motion to Dismiss, or Alternatively, for Summary Judgment. Defendants, represented by 
Derek Langton, filed memoranda in support of the motion. Plaintiff, represented by Robert C. 
Cummings, filed memoranda in opposition to the motion. Both Plaintiff and Defendants have 
submitted documents outside of the pleadings, and therefore, the Court considers the motion 
as a motion for summary judgment. The Court, after carefully considering the memoranda 
and other documents submitted to the Court, now enters the following: 
RULING 
I. 
FACTS AND PROCEDURE 
000
 162 
According to the records of the Department of Commerce of the State of Utah, the 
Salt Lake Investment Company filed Articles of Incorporation on February 19, 1955, 
Statement of Intent to Dissolve on October 22, 1965, and Articles of Dissolution on 
December 30, 1965. The Department of Commerce was unable to determine whether or not a 
Certificate of Dissolution was issued, but certified that the corporation was voluntarily 
dissolved on December 30, 1965. 
The Articles of Dissolution signed by Evelyn P. Boyce and Laron A. Boyce affirm 
that all debts, obligations and liabilities of the corporation have been discharged and that all 
property and assets of the corporation have been distributed among its shareholders. There 
has been no evidence of any activity whatsoever of the Salt Lake Investment Company for 
nearly 30 years; no business transacted, no filing of tax returns, etc. However, on October 




Summary judgment is appropriate if the pleadings, depositions, answers to 
interrogatories, admissions, together with the affidavits present no genuine issue as to any 
material fact. Rule 56(c), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Evidence which is in dispute 
should be interpreted in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Kirberg v. West 
One Bank, 872 P,2d 39, 40-41 (Utah App. 1994); Higgins v. Salt Lake City, 855 P.2d 231, 
233 (Utah 1993). 
000 161 
III MelVinliiiil'i1 ii in i nn I mi i ll i h I in mi'..I Il I ill I in in in in1. 1 II in. in I II Iiiiiiiiir, "Sliilll Lake Investment Company, 
is a dissolved corporation which does not have standing to sue or be sued. In response, 
I'ljiiilil'l iiissetts I I in. ii Hide corporation was not dissolved because an actual Certificate of 
Dissolution cannot be located. However, the Court finds that based upon the filin* 
Notice of Intent to Dissolve and of Articles of Dissolution with the Department of Commerce, 
that the Department properly determined that 
dissolved. Even if the Court were to deem the inability of the Department to locate a 
conclusion that the corporation was not dissolved 
on December 30, 1965, the Court finds that thirty years of total inactivity together with the 
other filings is sufficient to find a defacto dissolution. 
Plaintiffs next argument is that even if the corporation is dissolved 1 llnh slitduriniiy !,in\ 
in effect in 1965 as well as the present allows a corporation to sue and be sued after 
dissolution as part of the windn i ! i in lotated § 16 10a 1 -« 105 
(1953 as amended in 1992); U.i -\ v ;< • - (in effect in 1965). This Court finds that 30 
i (Mir mi I'll bn I i mi mi i I i in1 i1 iiiiiii ilhllli I I I I mi In mi mi I i I I in |i I I II in Ii iillips ul i corporation. Nearly every 
single statute of limitations would have run in such a time, records have certainly been lost, 
memories faded, and defendants would certainly be prejudiced by allowing a corporation to 
sue under the "winding-up" exception thirty years after dissolution. Therefore, the r'nyii fmrk 
that Plaintiff Salt Lake Investment Company has no standing to sue or be sued in Utah courts, 
and Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgme 
ooo
 160 
Each party has requested oral arguments in this matter. However, the Court finds 
Plaintiffs opposition to the motion to be frivolous, and therefore, declines to hear oral 
arguments on the motion pursuant to Rule 4-501(3)(c). 
Counsel for Defendants is instructed to prepare an order of dismissal of all claims 
consistent with this ruling, and the file shall be closed. 
Dated at Provo, Utah, this 27th day of March, 1995. 
BY THE COURT 
cc: Derek Langton, Esq. 
Robert C. Cummings, Esq. 
Wilford N. Hansen, Jr., Esq. 
? - — 7 » • • 7 
Judge Lynn W, Davis 
000 159 
DEREK LANGTON (4 068) 
PARSONS BEHLE & LATIMER 
Attorneys for defendants James T. Jensen, 
Jerry J. Jensen and Dix Jensen 
201 South Main Street, Suite 1800 
P.O. Box 45898 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 0898 
Telephone: (801 ) 532 -1234 
'IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL I1 f .STRICT » UUNT '»F "HAH COUNT,1 
STATE OF UTAH 
THE SALT LAKE INVESTMENT COM 
PANY, a Utah corporation, 
Plaint' iff, 
vs. 
WILFORD H. HANSEN STONE QUAR-
RIES, INC., a Utah corpora-
tion, SHARRON KILLION, JAMES 
T. JENSEN, JERRY J. JENSEN, 
DIX JENSEN, and all other 
persons unknown, claiming any-
right, title, estate or inter-
est in, or lien upon the real 
property described in the 
pleading adverse to the plain™ 
tiff's ownership, or clouding 
its title thereto, 
Defendants. 
ORDER GRANTING JENSEN DE-
FENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMA-
RY JUDGMENT 
C i v i l - ^ 94^4 00^1 
Judge 1 iyuri W Davi, 
* * * * * * • 
The Motion * *:m ~ 
il . L . - - . * • .-d December. - <
 t ; ;, 
Jensen Jei • .1 , Jensen and Dix Jenser 
Defendants") regularl ' -^  ; •'• ' . >~ 
162037 
- 1 y,, 1; or Summary 
: defendants James I . 
> r ^ i n a f t e r Lhe " J e n s e n 
:^< * Lb'ion . Because 
OOf- 184 
both Plaintiff and the Jensen Defendants submitted documents 
outside of the pleadings for the Court's consideration, the Court 
accordingly treats the Motion as one for summary judgment pursuant 
to Rules 12(b) and 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
After full consideration of the memoranda, papers and 
documents submitted by Plaintiff and the Jensen Defendants in 
support of and in opposition to the subject Motion, the Court 
issued its Ruling on Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, or Alternative-
ly, for Summary Judgment, dated March 27, 1995. In its Ruling, the 
Court determined, based on the undisputed facts, that the Salt Lake 
Investment Company was a corporation that was dissolved in 1965, 
and that said corporation therefore lacks standing to sue or be 
sued in Utah courts. Accordingly, 
It is hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the 
Jensen Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, or Alternatively, for Summary 
162037 - 2 - 000 183 
J' 
tifl: s Complaint shal- - •- .i;_ s i * ei.y are dismissed w;.ih pr-M; i, 
DATED this Z 7 day of /Up\/ L-~ , ,1995. 
El ! ! THE COURT:/ 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
ROBERT C. CUMMINGS 
Attorney for plaintiff 
162037 - 3 -
000 182 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this _/ day of April, 1995, I 
caused to be mailed, first class, postage prepaid, a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing ORDER GRANTING JENSEN DEFENDANTS' 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT, to: 
Robert C. Cummings 
225 South 200 East, #150 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Wilford N. Hansen, Jr. 
HANSEN & MAUGHAN 
Mountain'View East Professional Plaza 
1172 East Highway 6, Suite 7 
P.O. Box 67 
Payson, Utah 84651-0067 




IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE SALT LAKE INVESTMENT 
COMPANY, a Utah corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
EILFORD H. HANSEN STONE 
QUARRIES, INC. a Utah corporation, 
SHARON KILLION, JAMES T. JENSEN, 
JERRY J. JENSEN, DIX JENSEN, and all 
other persons unknown, claiming any right, 
title, estate or interest in, or lien upon the 
real property described in the pleading 
adverse to the plaintiffs ownership, or 
clouding it's title thereto, 
Defendants. 
RULING ON PLAINTIFF'S 
MOTION TO ALTER AND 
AMEND JUDGMENT 
CASE: 940400611 
JUDGE: LYNN W. DAVIS 
This matter came before the Court on Plaintiffs Motion to Alter and Amend Judgment 
pursuant to Rule 59(e), URCP. Plaintiff filed a Memorandum of Points & Authorities in 
Support of its motion with Defendant1 '• I«M" ,i Memnnml'ii" "i ' »pP<,s''"1" '" 'I1'' mi'l"iM 
Plaintiff also filed a Reply Memorandum. The Court after carefully considering the 
On Mar* 
filed by Plaintm aait 1 
RULING 
I. 
FACTS AND PROCEDURE 
-iirt upon motion of Defendants, Dismissed the complaint 
M l o ourt iou; 
onn 
-3; / 
that Plaintiff Corporation had dissolved, either de jure or de facto, nearly thirty years prior to 
the commencement of the action. Based on this finding the Court applied Utah law in effect 
in 1965, the year of dissolution, and determined that there was no legal basis for the suit to 
proceed. 
Plaintiff now requests that the judgment be altered or amended due to plain error in 
applying the law. 
II. 
ISSUE PRESENTED 
Is the Order to Dismiss based on a faulty application of statutory law? 
m. 
DISCUSSION 
In reviewing the file the Court found that the Order signed by the Court is titled Order 
Granting Jensen Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment. However, a plain reading of the 
Order clearly indicates that the case was dismissed for lack of standing. The Court believes 
that such a drafting error is a harmless error and not grounds for attacking the decision. 
Plaintiff does not in fact raise this issue in its pleading and while referring to the Order as a 
Summary Judgment Order, the arguments presented deal with the issues of standing and the 
dismissal of the action. 
Nothing in the memoranda filed with the Court persuades this Court that the judgment 
should be altered or amended. Plaintiff corporation filed an intent with the State of Utah to 
dissolve and according to the Articles of Dissolution filed with the State and signed by the 
officers of the corporation \ 111 remaining property and assets of the corporation have been 
distributed among its shareholders, in accordance with their respective rights and interests." 
Articles of Dissolution Fourth paragraph dated December 29, 1965 and filed with the State on 
r >»111] 111 (i ( i i n i" J 11' i r i i i r»111111»11' t
 (11 (* 111111 mi I in 11111 I mi in I mi in 11 11111111111 111 mi in 11 1111 () 1111111111 mi 11 
exert P . action showing ownership or control over this property during the nearly thirty 
year mding of defacto dissolution and the lack of 
standing to bring the action. This Court is ilot persuaded by the cases relied upon by Plaintiff 
in argument In Falconaero Enterprise. Inc. v. Valley Investment Company. 395 P.2d >1C 
(Utah 1964), there are insufficient facts detailed to determine whether the acceptance e 
statutory wording of Title 16-10-100 and 16-10-101, 'in erf^cf !r 1965 but repealed in 1992), 
relied upon in that case by that court . 'lacka^_&. Ki.obel 
Enterprises. Inc. v. Teton Van Gas. Inc.. 460 P.2d 828 (Utah), the court used the statutory 
pro\ isioih (it Iiili> hi in inn iiiil In Hi lull in nulojji/e in a i J« i nlieic llu' iorporation 
powers had been suspended by the state. Neither of these cases provide substantial support 
for the arguments set foith by IMaintill 
M. r 0 
DECISION 
This Court declines to disturb the prior dciisinn In In hi nl' I he jiliinc IIIM.II MUM iln 





(1) Plaintiffs request for oral argument is denied pursuant to Rule 4-501 (3)(c) 
UJA. 
(2) Plaintiffs motion to alter or amend judgment is denied. 
Dated at Provo, Utah, this J_ day of A//l^ . 1995. 
BY THE COURT 
cc: Robert C. Cummings, Esq. 
Derek Langton, Esq. 
A 000 2 
and the sa i d counterclaim of the Corporate Defendant and of 
defendant Kill ion are dismissed with prejudice, and the said cross 
I l i i i u* p u n l i i c il if* 1; P I M.I . i n in! i i i ! il I I l l e tendant K : ." I "on i s 
dismissed without prejudice^ and It is adjudged that o :laims of 
my kind are reserved for 1 ater determinati on by s . - Court, the 
I :i iii s p o s e ci o f • a ] 1  - •• a J ] par ti es . 
DATED the <£3 day of September. 199S. 
9 
CO\$RT JUDGE 
/ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ; ^ ^ -
 f 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
A copy of the foregoing proposed Supplemental Order was 
mailed to Derek Langton, attorney for defendants Jensen, at his 
address, P. 0. Box 45898, Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0898, and a 
copy was mailed to Wilford N. Hansen, Jr., attorney for the 
Corporate Defendant and for Sharron Killion, at his address, P. O. 
Box 67, Payson, Utah 84651-0067, all postage prepaid, this 
"2 y day of September, 1995. 
(JUA- ^  & 
Attorney for the Plaintiff 
-4-
ROBERT C. CUMMINGS, #777 
Attorney for the Plaintiffs 
225 South 200 East, #150 
Salt Lake Cityr Utah 8* 
Te1ephone: 322-114 ] 
DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
UTAH COUNT 
THE SALT LAKE INVESTMENT COMPANY, 
A Utah Corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
V5.i 
W I L F 0 R D H^ H A N S E N S T ( ) N E 
QUARRIES, INC., A Utah 
corporation, SHARRON KILLION, 
JAMES T. JENSEN, JERRY J. JENSEN, 
DIX JENSEN, and all other persons 
unknown, claiming any right, 
title, estate or interest ii i, • : i : 
lien upon the real property 
described in the pleading adverse 
to the plaintiff's ownership, or 
clouding its title thereto, 
Defendants,, 
The plaintiff complains of the defendants and for < .nise 
of iction alleges as follows: 
rin'H^  plaintiff I s a Utah corporation sometimes known 
and designated c Offi ce ' sf the I J t ::!: :; Seer e tar i' • ::;f State (a: id 
successors) as Corporate File No 30474 
." , "' 1111" 111 a i n t i f £ is the owner s imple and 
entitled to possession of a certain real y 













AMIS NO. 1 PLACER, a patented mining claim being Patent 
Mineral Survey No. 4224, and being a part of Sections 35 
and 36, Township 11 South, Range 9 East, SLB&M. 
(Containing approximately 17.466 acres.) 
3. The defendants assert and claim an interest in and 
to the above-described Property which is adverse to and which 
constitutes a cloud upon the title of the plaintiff to said 
Property. 
4. The claim asserted by the defendants is without any 
right whatsoever, and the said defendants have no estate, right, 
title or interest in, or lien upon, said Property or any part 
thereof. 
WHEREFORE, plaintiff prays for judgment as follows: 
1. That the defendants be required to set forth the 
nature and extent of their claims to said Property, that all 
adverse claims of the defendants be determined by decree of this 
court and that in said decree it be ordered, adjudged and decreed 
as follows: 
A. That the plaintiff is the owner in fee simple 
and entitled to possession of the aforesaid Property as against the 
defendants, and that the title to the Property, and the whole 
thereof, be quieted in the plaintiff and against the defendants. 
B. That the defendants and any and all persons, if 
any, claiming by, through or under defendants have no right, title 
or interest in, or lien upon, the above-described Property, or any 
part thereof; that any and all adverse claims of the defendants be 
-2-
nn A 4 
declared mi I I and void and rurther force and effect; and : 
the defendants and all persons i ? any, claiming by, through or 
under said defendants be forever enjoined, debarred and restrained 
from asserting any cl aim or interest whatsoever in or to the said 
Property herein described adverse to the ownership and title of the 
p II a i n t 1 I" 1 1 ill iini! Il I in mi ill! I"i o p e i I, y I'm i II i iiuiill in i l l ) |p 1 1 mi m l in 1 II " 1 i I 1 e 
t h e r e t o . 
( r>* olaintiff be awarded such further and 
ciMijil i I j una 1 i m] 
D F or costs and for such other relief as I s ji ist 
to be granted in the premises. 
SECOI ID CJ a JSE OF i id, IOI i 
The plaintiff complains of the* defendants, Wilford H 
Hansen Stone Quarries , Inc. and Sharron Ki ] 1 ion (hereinafter 
i'pfen Mil I is I 
for cause of action alleges as follows: 
1. The plaintiff is a I Jtah corporation sometimes known 
arid designated il in I h v Of. t ice c: f the • -t:ary of State (and 
successors) as Corporate File No. 30474. 
2. The plaintiff i s the owner * • • simple and 
€ "• " ei: ta I l I I ract r 
("Property1 situate County, Utah, more particularly 
described as follows: 
Tract 
PHILIPPINE MINE LODE, . p a t e n t e d m i n i n g c l a i m b e i n g 
000 
Patent Mineral Survey No. 5874, and being part of Section 
25, Township 6 South, Range 1 West, SLB&M. (Containing 
approximately 20.661 acres.) 
Tract No. 2: 
B, Bl, B2, B3, B4, and B5 LODE, a group of patented 
mining claims being Patent Mineral Survey No. 6866, and 
being part of Sections 35 and 36, Township 9 South, Range 
3 West, SLB&M. (Containing approximately 121.955 acres.) 
3. The Defendants assert and claim an interest in and 
to the above-described Property which is adverse to and which 
constitutes a cloud upon the title of the plaintiff to said 
Property. 
4. Th£ claim asserted by the Defendants is without any 
right whatsoever, and the said Defendants have no estate, right, 
title or interest in, or lien upon, said Property or any part 
thereof. 
WHEREFORE, plaintiff prays for judgment as follows: 
1. That the Defendants be required to set forth the 
nature and extent of their claims to said Property, that all 
adverse claims of the Defendants be determined by decree of this 
court, and that in said decree it be ordered, adjudged and decreed 
as follows: 
A. That the plaintiff is the owner in fee simple 
and entitled to possession of the aforesaid Property as against the 
Defendants, and that the title to the said Property, and the whole 
thereof, be quieted in the plaintiff and against the Defendants. 
B. That the Defendants and any and all persons, if 
-4-
000 
any, claiming by, through or i it iciei: Defendants have no right, title 
or i nterest in, ULGU U, :::)! i the above-described Property / 
p . . . ^nv and a] 1 adverse claims of the Defendants be 
declared null and void and of no further force and effect; and that 
the Defendants a nil «i il I persons, i f ai i/y claimin throua 
under said Defendants be forever enjoined, debarred .. *- restrained 
from asserting any claim, or Interest whatsoever :i n or to the 
Property herp t:i tJ <a • : (I: bh 2 
plaint . . , ;, vin Jropertf < louding plaintiff's title 
thereto, 
C. That the p] a i 1 iti f f t •€ aw ai: ded si :icl: 1 fi lr bher an: 1 1 
additional relief as to the coin: t may seem just and proper. 
D* ' For costs and for such other relief as is just 
1 ses. 
THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION 
The plaintiff complains of the defendants, Wilforci H 
I , . 
re fer red to as "Defendants" i i 1 t h i s Second Cause of Acti on) , and 
for cause of action, a l leges as fo] ] ows: 
1 . • Till: 11 it" I I I .11 lb >pl .! 5 II ,1 :IL 
Cause of Action, 
2. The Defendants have removed stone, or other 
IPfl* f I I" 1 'I I I I Ii» l ( ' M M M *» 1 < 1 1 I If '"It O f U " l 
from said Property without authorization from the plaintiff. 
3. The plaintiff has been damaged by such unauthorized 
5 
000 
removal of Stone in an amount not now known to plaintiff, and 
discovery will be necessary to ascertain the full extent of said 
damages. 
WHEREFORE, plaintiff prays for judgment against 
Defendants for damages for the reasonable value of the Stone thus 
removed from the property, as proved at trial, together with 
interest and costs, and for such other relief as is just to be 
granted in the premises. 
4 
'L/rf^ 
ROBERT C. CUMMINGS 
Attorney for the Plaintiff J^"~} 
-6-
ROBERT C. CUMMINGS, #777 
Attorney for the Plaintiff 
225 South 200 East, #150 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone 322-1141 
!/) 
II! Till' I HI IRTI I .Mill I *M A DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STAT TAH 
THE SALT LAKE INVESTMENT COMPANY, 
A Utah corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
W I L F 0 R D H> HANSEN*SToNE 
QUARRIES, INC., a Utah 
Corporation, SHARRON KILLION 
JAMES T. JENSEN, JERRY J, JENSEN, 
DIX JENSEN, and all other persons 
unknot i 1, claiming any right, 
title, estate or interest in 
lien upon the real property 
described in the pleading adverse 
to the plaintiff's ownership, or 




CONFIRMING DISMISSAL OF 
ALL CLAIMS 
Civil No. 940400611 
Judge Lynn W, Davis 
Pursuant to notice, a conference was hPld the ,1]i\h iJa, : 
September, 1Q 0 c>, between the c «..rt mi * p d r n e s through counsel, 
whprr'in I il parties threw'?,1 • ~*v- * - ommunicatmn * «' ti the 
Court and other counsel; i-^ i>.: . • i • / 
fot plaintiff, Derek I.angton appearir i as attorney L O T 
<l<%f finlant •. Jensen ,":if ••• --* s Jensen 
(hereinafter "defendants Jensen"), .iiinlli W L J I O H I II 
appearing < ; attorney * - defendants, Wilford !I Hansen Stone 
yua J:' r j e s 11 f w i * i n.i 1 ' »• r " Corporate 
Defendant"), and Sharron Killion (hereinafter "Killion"), and in 
said conference the Court considered the matter of the finality of 
the Order heretofore entered herein on the 27th day of April, 1995, 
entitled "Order Granting Jensen Defendants' Motion for Summary 
Judgment" and the court having hearing the arguments of counsel and 
having duly considered said matter, and whereas the Court intended 
in and by said order of April 27, 1995, to dismiss all claims in 
this action and not just those of the plaintiff, and whereas the 
Court desires by this Supplemental Order to remove any ambiguity as 
to the Court's said intention which may exist by reason of the 
wording of said order of April 27, 1995, 
NOW THEREFORE UPON THE COURT'S OWN MOTION IT IS HEREBY 
ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED: 
1. The claims in this action are (1) plaintiff 
complaint; (2) counterclaim of the Corporate Defendant and 
defendant Killion against plaintiff; and (3) cross claim of 
Corporate Defendant and defendant Killion against "the other 
Defendants". That the aforesaid Order entered on April 27, 1995, 
was intended as a dismissal of all claims in this action, as 
follows, to-wit: consistent with the Court's ruling that plaintiff 
cannot sue or be sued, the said complaint and the said counterclaim 
were intended to be dismissed with prejudice, and the intent of the 
Court was to dismiss the said cross claim without prejudice. 
2. In ratification and confirmation of such intention, 
it is hereby declared and adjudged that plaintiff's said complaint 
-2-
DEREK LANGTON (4068) 
PARSONS BEHLE & LATIMER 
Attorneys for defendants James T. Jensen, 
Jerry J. Jensen and Dix Jensen 
201 South Main Street, Suite 1800 
P.O. Box 45898 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0898 
Telephone: (801) 532-1234 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OP UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OP UTAH 
* * * * * * * 
THE SALT LAKE INVESTMENT COM-
PANY, a Utah corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
WILFORD H. HANSEN STONE QUAR-
RIES, INC., a Utah corpora-
tion, SHARRON KILLION, JAMES 
T. JENSEN, JERRY J. JENSEN, 
DIX JENSEN, and all other 
persons unknown, claiming any-
right, title, estate or inter-
est in, or lien upon the real 
property described in the 
pleading adverse to the plain-
tiff's ownership, or clouding 
its title thereto, 
Defendants. 
MOTION TO DISMISS, OR AL-
TERNATIVELY, FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 940400611 
Judge Lynn W. Davis 
* * * * * * * 
Pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, defendants James T. Jensen, Jerry J. Jensen and Dix 
Jensen (hereinafter the "Jensen Defendants") hereby respectfully 
move the Court for an Order dismissing the plaintiff's Complaint 
146749 
000 
with prejudice as against said Jensen Defendants for failure to 
state a claim upon which relief may be granted on the grounds that 
(1) plaintiff was a Utah corporation which was voluntarily 
dissolved in 1965, and which therefore no longer exists, (2) 
plaintiff's sole remaining former shareholders, who are the 
individuals purporting to act on behalf of the corporate plaintiff 
in bringing the present action, previously quit-claimed their 
interests, if any, in the Amis No. 1 placer mining claim to the 
Jensen Defendants. 
Alternatively, because the Jensen Defendants are 
submitting certain documents in support of this Motion, this Motion 
can properly be treated as a motion for summary judgment pursuant 
to Rules 12(b) and 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
This Motion is further based on the accompanying 
Memorandum of Points and Authorities in support hereof. 
DATED this 30^day of December, 1994. 
PARSONS BEHLE & LATIMER 
^y^^/^ui 
)EREK LANGTOI 
Attorneys for defendants James 
T. Jensen, Jerry J. Jensen 
and Dix Jensen 
146749 -2-
000 s 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this 20 day of December, 199A, 
I caused to be mailed, first class, postage prepaid, a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing MOTION TO DISMISS, OR ALTERNATIVELY, 
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT, to: 
Robert C. Cummings 
225 South 200 East, #150 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
ykO\jJr\aAA^ 
146749 -3- 000 
